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In the fight against insurgents, terrorists, and criminals, the United States (US) has worked 
with numerous armed groups in Afghanistan. We call these actors ‘force multipliers’ as they 
are employed in order to increase the capabilities of national and international forces by 
supporting them in security functions. In Afghanistan, force multipliers comprise four types 
of actors: Private Security Companies (PSCs), the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), 
militias, and auxiliary police forces. This report argues that force multipliers are a problem 
for the physical and economic security of the local population in Afghanistan which 
urgently needs to be addressed.  
As key causes of the negative impact of international force multipliers on human 
security, our analysis identifies weaknesses in the areas of recruitment, vetting, command 
and control, and prosecution of these forces. Such weaknesses have allowed armed groups 
to pursue their own parochial interests; these include the involvement in competition 
among various clans and power brokers, the exploitation of the local population, and the 
expansion of their own influence.  
Both the US and the international community share responsibility for this development. 
This report illustrates how the US, in particular, has funded, trained, equipped and made 
use of force multipliers in Afghanistan for a variety of reasons. PSCs were first brought to 
Afghanistan in the wake of the intervention in order to relieve US military forces of security 
support functions. Over the years, their number and role have expanded exponentially. 
While many PSCs have operated according to the law, major national and international 
companies have been implicated in human rights violations. In response, as of 2010, the 
Afghan government has sought to replace all armed PSCs with a government-owned 
private security provider, the APPF. However, due to problems with developing the APPF, 
many international actors continue to rely on PSCs. With the March 2014 decision by the 
Afghan government to disband the APPF, the renewed proliferation of PSCs seems possible 
which could have significant consequences for human security.  
Furthermore, the US has also collaborated with Afghan militias and supported the 
development of auxiliary police forces to relieve national and international military forces of 
security responsibilities. In some districts, these pro-government armed groups have 
contributed to stability, while, in others, the opposite has been the case: militias and 
auxiliary police have threatened, tortured and murdered local citizens and stolen their 
property.  
Through an investigation of these actors, the present report aims to address an existing 
imbalance in the analysis of the international intervention in Afghanistan. This relates to 
force multipliers being understood primarily as expedient means for achieving strategic 
security objectives. By placing their impact on human security at center stage, this report 
seeks to illustrate the dangers to the local population implicit in using force multipliers. 
In conclusion, this report recommends that rather than pursuing quick-fix strategies 
through a multiplicity of non-state armed groups, the US and its allies should focus their 
resources on helping create effective and accountable national armed and police forces in 
 II 
Afghanistan. The funds, training and equipment that have been invested into force 
multipliers could have made a major contribution to achieving this goal. Instead, they have 
fostered the development of a security environment in which a myriad of armed groups vie 
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1.  Introduction 
The year 2014 marked the end of large-scale international combat operations in 
Afghanistan.1 Debates are rife over whether and how security can be established in post-
2014 Afghanistan. The discussions about suitable strategies for international security 
assistance to Afghan armed forces have been limited in two ways: First, they have revolved 
primarily around the main Afghan National Security Forces; second, they have focused on 
the stability of the Afghan state.  
This report aims to address these limitations by examining the role and impact of other 
pro-government armed groups which have been supported and utilized by the international 
community in an attempt to provide stability. Specifically, the report investigates how these 
armed groups have impacted on human security in Afghanistan, i.e. the physical and 
economic security of the civilian population. 
The following study shows how the United States (US), in particular, has developed, 
funded, trained, equipped and utilized a range of armed actors in Afghanistan, which have 
gone on to become independent forces. We call these actors ‘force multipliers’ as they are 
employed in order to increase the capabilities of national and international forces by 
supporting them in security functions.2 In Afghanistan, these force multipliers comprise 
four types of actors, which are often interlinked through personal connections and 
subcontracting: Private Security Companies (PSCs),3 the Afghan Public Protection Force 
(APPF), militias, and auxiliary police forces.  
In analyzing the impacts of these actors from a human security perspective, this report 
follows a shift in security paradigms from a state-centered understanding of security to one 
that places the security of individuals at center stage. While state-centered analyses of the 
international security strategy in Afghanistan focus largely on military issues – namely 
successes in the fight against the Taliban –, these studies often ignore the fact that the 
ultimate objective of security policies is to protect human life and the well-being of the 
Afghan population. However, whether this objective is achieved or undermined through the 




1  We are grateful to the interviewees for speaking to us (many on the condition of anonymity), as well as to 
Oldrich Bures, Carolin Liss, Thomas Müller and Simone Wisotzki for their comments. Elke Krahmann 
would like to acknowledge Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) funding for this research as 
part of her project ‘Markets in the Making of Multilateral Military Interventions: International 
Organizations and Private Military and Security Companies’, grant number ES/J021091/1, 
2  This definition builds on the US Department of Defense’s understanding of force multipliers as ‘a 
capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat 
potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment’, at: 
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/f/8037.html (23.2.2015).  
3  This Report uses the US government’s definition of PSCs as companies that provide “personal security, 
convoy security, and static security missions” (CENTCOM 2014).  
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Although there is discord among ‘broad’ definitions of human security – which can 
include everything from safety to health and underdevelopment – and ‘narrow’ definitions 
– which pertain only to violent threats –, academic and policy-making circles now accept 
widely that security includes more than the mere survival of the state (Owen 2004; Martin/ 
Owen 2014). This report adopts a middle road by defining human security as “the human 
consequences of armed conflict and the dangers posed to civilians by repressive 
governments and situations of state failure” (Newman 2010: 80). Within this context, the 
study focuses on victimization by “identifiable human agents” (Owen 2014: 376). However, 
it shows that human insecurity is not only caused by direct violence, but also by conflict-
related crime and economic exploitation.  
This report argues that the conditions and prospects for human security in Afghanistan 
are poor and that the proliferation of armed force multipliers is one reason for this. An 
important indicator of human insecurity is an increase in civilian casualties. In Afghanistan, 
civilian casualty figures have been on the rise for several years now: between January and 
June of 2014, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA 2014: 1) 
reported that 4,853 persons had been killed or wounded as a result of the armed conflict. 
This is a 24-percent increase in civilian casualties compared to the first six months of 2013.  
The following analysis shows that the actions of PSCs, the APPF, militias and auxiliary 
forces have been major contributing factors to undermining human security in 
Afghanistan. An assessment of these four actors in comparison to Afghan governmental 
forces is not possible due to the limitation of the official data regarding the human security 
impact of pro-government armed groups to the auxiliary police forces (e.g. UNAMA 2014). 
Instead, this report aims to illustrate the scope and the character of human insecurity 
resulting from the use of force multipliers. In order to go about this, the report draws on 
four types of sources: academic and policy publications, official documents from 
international organizations, governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
and media reports. In addition, the report includes information from personal observations 
in Afghanistan and interviews with representatives from international organizations, 
governments, security forces, NGOs and ordinary citizens. This information was collected 
over the course of five trips between 2009 and 2013 to various parts of Afghanistan (with a 
focus on Kabul and northern Afghanistan, but also including trips to the south and east).  
The report is structured into four sections. Section 1 examines the reasons for the 
establishment and the development of the main force multipliers in Afghanistan: PSCs, the 
APPF, militias and auxiliary police forces. Section 2 analyzes key pathologies associated 
with the use of these actors in support of the international security strategy within the 
country. Section 3 illustrates how these pathologies have contributed to undermining the 
human security of the local population in Afghanistan. Section 4 concludes with the 
recommendations that more must be done to control pro-government armed groups in 
Afghanistan and that international actors should refrain from using force multipliers in 
future interventions on account of the fact that they jeopardize long-term human security.  
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2. Causes of the Force Multiplier Problem 
The motivational and structural causes associated with the emergence of force multipliers as 
independent security forces and the problems they pose for human security in Afghanistan 
are manifold. This section first discusses why the US, in particular, has supported and used 
force multipliers as part of the international security strategy within the country. This is 
followed by an investigation of the structural conditions and developments contributing to 
major pathologies with regard to the relations and operations of PSCs, the APPF, militias 
and auxiliary police forces.  
The US has promoted the use of force multipliers in Afghanistan for a variety of reasons. 
One motivation was the absence of statutory Afghan security forces when the first 
international troops entered the country in late 2001. Since the development of the Afghan 
National Security Forces under the new regime proceeded slowly, the US turned to pre-
existing armed groups – including the employment of PSCs and the collaboration with 
militias – as quick-fix force multipliers.  
Additionally, force multipliers enabled the US and its allies to deploy fewer active 
military service personnel or police officers to Afghanistan. PSCs and the APPF relieved US 
forces and the ISAF of military support functions and armed guarding for military 
transport, logistics and bases. Auxiliary police forces were promoted by the US as an 
expedient stopgap measure since the establishment of the Afghan National Police (ANP) 
was lagging, expensive and cumbersome. 
Another reason for the use of force multipliers in Afghanistan lay in their ability to 
operate largely outside the scrutiny of the public and parliamentary bodies of the sending 
states. Force multipliers not only reduced the threat of a public backlash in response to 
‘body bags’ returning home to countries such as the US, but also enabled governments to 
circumvent troop limits approved by parliament as well as public criticism.    
Moreover, in the short term, relying on force multipliers was considered more cost 
effective than increasing the size of the Afghan National Army (ANA) or the ANP 
(Goodhand/Hakimi 2014: 14). It freed the ANA and ANP of tasks such as static guard duty, 
allowing military and police planners to use the ANA and ANP for more important tasks, 
such as offensive counterinsurgency operations. Furthermore, the US military hoped that 
force multipliers could be either disbanded or integrated into the ANA and ANP once they 
were no longer needed. As one officer remarked with reference to an auxiliary police force 
unit: “the ALP [Afghan Local Police] was never designed to be anything other than a short-
term fix.”4 
Other motivations were idiosyncratic to the US counterinsurgency doctrine and 
experience, including reliance on local defense forces and cooperation with militias in Iraq. 
 
 
4  Author’s interview with Colonel Ashton Hayes, US Army, Senior Advisor to the Afghan Minister of 
Interior, CSTC-A, Camp Eggers, Kabul, 21 July 2013. 
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The counterinsurgency manual issued by the US military in 2006 emphasizes the 
importance of local allies (US Army and US Marine Corps 2007). According to one US 
military officer: “a reasonable Afghan solution is far better than a perfect Western solution 
that they will never implement.”5 Iraq played a role as well. As of 2006, the US allied with 
Sunni tribal militias numbering 100,000 who helped fight Al Qaeda militants. These militias 
received financial and military support from the US and were credited for reducing violence 
in Iraq to a level that allowed the withdrawal of the US troops from the country. After 
becoming ISAF commander in mid-2010, US general David Petraeus drew analogies 
between Iraqi and Afghan militias.6 Even before Petraeus took command in Afghanistan, 
the US military had pushed for auxiliary police programs – often with little consultation 
with other US government agencies such as the US Department of State or the US Embassy 
in Kabul (Lefèvre 2010: 19-20). 
For these reasons, PSCs, the APPF, militias and auxiliary police forces emerged as major 
players within the Afghan security environment. The following sections discuss the 
problematic evolution of each of these force multipliers since the beginning of the 
Afghanistan intervention. 
2.1 Private Security Companies 
Since the late 1990s, military and security contractors have successfully established 
themselves as helpmates to governments involved in international interventions and post-
conflict states (Krahmann 2010; Stanger 2009; Kinsey 2006; Avant 2005; Singer 2003). In 
particular, the US government is “relying heavily, apparently for the first time during 
combat or stability operations, on private firms to supply a wide variety of security services” 
(Schwartz 2011: 1). The use of contractors has not remained limited to military support 
services. The employment of armed and unarmed security guards to protect military and 
civilian bases, logistics convoys, and personnel has become increasingly widespread and 
accepted within multilateral interventions.  
 
 
5  Briefing by Major General Richard Formica, Commander Combined Security Transition Command – 
Afghanistan (CSTC-A), attended by one of the authors, Kabul, 28 September 2009.  
6  Briefing attended by one of the authors, ISAF HQ, Kabul, 9 October 2010. 
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In Afghanistan, the proliferation of armed guards has been the most pronounced. Between 
2008 and 2012, the number of security guards contracted with the US Department of 
Defense increased more than tenfold from 2,745 to 28,686 (CENTCOM 2014) [see Figure 
1]. About 90 percent of these security guards were armed (Schwartz 2011: 2). They provided 
four main services: static security, convoy protection, travel security for personnel and 24-
hour security for high-ranking officials (Checchia 2011: 2).  
While the US may lead in the use of PSCs as force multipliers, a number of other 
countries have also employed armed security contractors in Afghanistan (Krahmann/ 
Friesendorf 2011; Leander 2013). Canada, for instance, hired four PSCs to secure its ISAF 
forward operating bases in Kandahar (Moore 2010). The Netherlands employed security 
contractors to guard the outer circle of military installations in the country (AIV 2007; 
Finabel 2008: 14). Germany contracted individually 246 Afghan security guards to help 
safeguard its military bases in Faisabad, Mazar-e Sharif, Kunduz and Taloquan (Krahmann/ 
Friesendorf 2011: 8, 11). France outsourced security and protection services in part for the 
primarily French ‘Camp Warehouse’ in Kabul (Leander 2013).  
International organizations – including NATO, the European Union (EU) and the 
United Nations (UN) – also used armed PSCs to secure their military and civilian bases 
(Krahmann/Friesendorf 2011). In Afghanistan, ISAF employed armed security guards to 
protect supply convoys on the dangerous transport route between Kabul and Kandahar – an 
 
 
7  CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports: www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/CENTCOM_reports.html 
(10.7.14). 
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area where contractors would engage regularly in skirmishes with up to 200 insurgents 
(WikiLeaks 2009-9-1; Filkins 2010). The EU hired routinely private security guards for its 
offices as well as its civilian and police missions in Afghanistan (Krahmann/Friesendorf 
2011). The UN employed the company IDG Security to provide armed guards to protect its 
personnel and premises in Afghanistan (UN 2012: 12). 
The proliferation of private armed security guards in Afghanistan has been a 
consequence of the international use of PSCs as force multipliers. Prior to the international 
intervention, PSCs did not exist in the country. International PSCs were first brought to 
Afghanistan through contracts with the US and other ISAF forces. They went on to account 
for the majority of the private security industry operating in the country before 2007, with 
57 international companies compared to 18 national firms (Sherman/DiDomenico 2009: 4). 
However, the number of Afghan PSCs expanded rapidly to between 60 and 90 firms. By 
2010, nationally owned companies comprised about half of the PSCs operating in the 
country (CNN 2010).  
As PSCs were a new phenomenon and the rebuilding of state institutions was 
proceeding slowly, companies operating in Afghanistan did not become regulated until 
2008. Moreover, international PSCs employed by the US were exempt from local 
prosecution due to Status of Forces Agreements. As the following analysis will show, the 
lack of regulation and control was extremely problematic because US security contractors 
were authorized expressly “to use deadly force when such force reasonably appears 
necessary to execute their security mission to protect assets/persons, consistent with the 
terms and conditions contained in their contract or with their job description and terms of 
employment” (DOD 2006: 34826). These policies placed increasingly security contractors in 
combat-like situations (UN 2010: 6; Aikins 2012: 6). Between 2009 and 2010, a total of 319 
US security contractors were killed in action in Afghanistan, compared with 626 US soldiers 
(Schwartz 2011: 9). Furthermore, national and international armed security guards became 
involved in civilian casualties and other forms of human insecurity.  
2.2 Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) 
On account of these developments, President Karzai issued Decree 62 in 2010, ordering the 
dissolution of all armed PSCs in Afghanistan in favor of the APPF (APPF 2012a). The 
government designed the APPF as a state-owned company so that it could sell protective 
services to domestic and international customers (APPF 2012b). Between 2012 and 2014, 
security contractors in Afghanistan were replaced progressively by APPF guards [see Figure 
1]. 
However, a number of exceptions under the prohibition of armed security contractors 
existed, meaning that PSCs remained a problem. In addition to the provision of security 
guards for diplomatic missions, PSCs were able to re-register as Risk Management 
Companies with permission to provide risk advice for private clients as well as offer training 
and mentoring to the APPF (APPF 2012a). As the establishment of the 25,000 member 
strong APPF progressed only slowly, the Afghan government approved a “bridging 
strategy” which allowed armed PSCs to continue operating under some circumstances. In 
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2014, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported that 
only five US military forward operating bases were protected by the APPF while 43 bases 
were still being secured by PSCs (SIGAR 2014: 96).  
In March 2014, the Afghan government therefore announced the dissolution of the 
APPF (Hodge 2014). While the Afghan government has envisaged that the ANP will 
assume the APPF’s role as armed security service provider (SIGAR 2014: 87-88), the 
termination of the APPF gives cause to speculations about decreased public security and a 
renewed resurgence of the PSC industry (Janes 2014; Hodge 2014).  
2.3 Militias 
From the outset of the invasion of Afghanistan, the US military identified Afghan militias as 
suitable additional force multipliers. Already in toppling the Taliban government and their 
al Qaeda allies, the US relied on local armed groups, such as the anti-Taliban Northern 
Alliance, to carry out fighting on the ground. US forces supported these fighters on the 
battlefield by pinpointing Taliban targets and calling in air strikes. As early as 2002, the US 
began combating insurgents with the help of Afghan militias (Giustozzi 2008: 166).  
Concurrently, international actors supported the government of interim president 
Hamid Karzai in the establishment of centralized security forces. The main pillars of the 
Afghan National Security Forces became the ANA and the ANP. As part of international 
efforts to build a centralized Afghan state, the UN promoted the demobilization, 
disarmament and re-integration (DDR) of former militias. DDR, which ran from 2003-
2005, was followed by another program, the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. Yet 
only few militiamen joined the newly constituted ANA (Goodhand/Hakimi 2014: 9).  
By 2004, it had become evident that the US-led war in Afghanistan had only been a 
superficial success. The ANP was seen as part of the problem rather than the solution owing 
to corruption and incompetence (Wilder 2007). Given the growing insurgency and the 
small international presence in Afghanistan, the US considered it expedient to continue 
collaborating with Afghan warlords and their militias, even at the expense of undermining 
DDR. One example was US support for Gul Agha Sherzai, governor of Kandahar province 
from 2001-2003. Although many local citizens regarded him as predatory, the US military 
treated him as a vital ally against suspect insurgents and terrorists (Chayes 2006). Another 
example is Ahmed Wali Karzai, a half-brother of President Hamid Karzai. As a crucial 
powerbroker in Kandahar province, he received US assistance for setting up a paramilitary 
anti-Taliban force, the Kandahar Strike Force. This was despite repeated allegations of his 
involvement in the drug trade (Filkins et al. 2009). 
2.4 Auxiliary Police Forces 
The first auxiliary police program took the form of the Afghan National Auxiliary Police 
(ANAP). It was launched in late 2006 by the Afghan Ministry of Interior and promoted by 
the US military with the aim of providing community policing within the districts as well as 
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participating in operations led by the Afghan National Security Forces. In order to carry out 
their tasks, the ANAP received training from DynCorp, a PSC paid by the US, including 
practical training in weapons handling and tactics. However, local strongmen managed to 
integrate their militias into the ANAP. Amid concerns that the force was undermining the 
disbanding of illegal armed groups, it was eventually dissolved in 2008 (Lefèvre 2010; 
Goodhand/Hakimi 2014: 10). 
In 2009, the US military led the design, funding and establishment of another auxiliary 
force, the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) (Lefèvre 2010: 8). Its objective was to 
empower local citizens to defend their villages and critical infrastructure such as highways 
and government buildings against insurgents. The US began the program with a pilot 
project in Wardak province because the Taliban had most of Wardak under their control 
and the small number of ANA and ANP was insufficient to reclaim the province.8 The US 
planned to expand the AP3 to other provinces in the future.  
Members of the AP3 were to be chosen by district leaders while vetting and approval fell 
to the Afghan Ministry of Interior, which held overall authority for the program. The 
National Directorate of Security participated in the vetting of auxiliary police, and US 
soldiers supervised the three-week training program that the ANP offered the AP3. Since 
other international partners – especially from the European Union – distanced themselves 
from the program, the US provided funding and equipment bilaterally (Lefèvre 2010: 12).  
Other auxiliary forces programs followed the AP3. Here, the US military led a vast array 
of initiatives, including the Community Defense Initiative, the Local Defense Initiative, the 
Critical Infrastructure Program, the Community-Based Security Solutions, the Interim 
Security for Critical Infrastructure, and Village Stability Operations. Differences notwith-
standing, all of these programs were supposed to complement efforts by international and 
Afghan security forces to reduce the control of insurgents over territory and people. 
The largest program to date has been the Afghan Local Police (ALP), a force with limited 
law enforcement competencies that include detaining suspect insurgents and then handing 
them over to the ANP. The authorized strength of the ALP measures 30,000 personnel;9 by 
1 December 2014, there were 27,837 ALP personnel, encompassing 150 districts in 29 out of 
34 provinces (SIGAR 2015: 98; UNAMA 2014: 40). US Special Forces were vital partners for 
the ALP. Not only did they provide training to the ALP over a period of a few weeks, the US 
was also the main funding source for the ALP. The US military paid initially ALP units in 
 
 
8  US Special Operations Forces (SOF) supported auxiliary police under the US Combined Forces Special 
Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A). A standard definition of SOF does not 
exist. Most commonly, the terms SOF and special forces refer to elite military units trained for missions 
such as unconventional warfare, reconnaissance and counter-terrorism. A variety of elite forces have 
worked with force multipliers in Afghanistan, including US Army Rangers and US Army Green Berets.  
9  In comparison, the ANA had an authorized strength of 195,000 and the ANP of 157,000. For financial 
year 2015, the US Department of Defense requested US$ 4.11 billion for the main fund used to finance the 
Afghan National Security Forces. According to NATO, the ALP will cost US$ 121 million per year to 
maintain once it reaches its target strength (SIGAR 2014: 67 and 100). 
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cash until the system was changed and the US funded the ALP by way of the Afghan 
Ministry of Interior as part of the police tashkeel (a staffing and management document). 
The US military also provided equipment and weapons. By 2014, the US had delivered 
23,246 AK-47 rifles, 4,045 PKM machine guns, 2,057 light trucks, 4,950 motorcycles, and 
2,686 radios to the ALP (SIGAR 2014: 100).  
Some international actors harbored skepticism towards the ALP. The European Union 
Police Mission, for one, wanted nothing to do with the scheme. However, the US was not 
alone in working with the ALP. British troops mentored the ALP in Helmand province 
(Stevens 2013). Indeed, Britain had called for the creation of village defense forces even 
before the US (Human Rights Watch 2011: 16-17). Germany also cooperated with the ALP 
on a small scale, although the German Ministry of Defense officially forbade German troops 
to work with the ALP.10 On the ground, however, German soldiers were reported to have 
trained and provided non-lethal equipment to ALP units (Monitor 2013; see also Münch 
2013: 38).  
In sum, the use of force multipliers has mainly been driven by the interests of the US and 
other states engaged in Afghanistan. PSCs, the APPF, militias and auxiliary police forces 
were viewed as quick-fix solutions that enabled the international coalition to minimize its 
military footprint, cut costs and reduce any potential political fall-out from military 
casualties. The haphazard and unplanned manner in which the US, in particular, had 
created, supported and employed force multipliers facilitated the emergence of a security 
environment in which diverse armed groups compete for power and influence. The next 
section examines the reasons why force multipliers have become a source of human 
insecurity in Afghanistan.  
3. Pathologies 
Several pathologies explain when and why force multipliers may impact negatively on 
human security. One set of pathologies concerns the parochial interests of these actors, such 
as their involvement in local power struggles, their own bids for influence, and their 
connections with other armed groups, including even the Taliban. Another set of 
pathologies relates to insufficient national and international oversight of PSCs, the APPF, 
militias and auxiliary forces, including ineffective regulation, problems with recruitment 
and vetting, weak command and control, and freedom from prosecution. While these 




10  Briefing by German general attended by one of the authors, Berlin, 1 July 2010. 
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3.1 Involvement in Power Competition  
The connections of national PSCs, militias and, to some degree, auxiliary forces to 
prominent Afghan clans have become a major cause of concern because they have involved 
force multipliers in local and national power struggles. Rather than acting as the agents of 
the US, ISAF or the Afghan government, these connections have allowed force multipliers 
to be instrumentalized by various families, power brokers and tribes in the pursuit of 
parochial interests. The local population has often been caught in the middle of this power 
competition.  
The first national PSCs, in particular, were established and used to strengthen the power 
bases of leading Afghan clans (Sherman/DiDomenico 2009: 1) [see Box 1]. Several of these 
PSCs held contracts with the US military, ISAF and other coalition member states. Watan 
Risk Management (2014) protected over 400 convoys under a subcontract for ISAF and 
held additional contracts for the protection of US military forward operating bases. NCL 
Security performed security services for contractors from the US Department of Defense 
and was awarded portions of the Host Nation Trucking contract in 2009 (House of 
Representatives 2010: 13).  
US and ISAF security contracts with these PSCs thus contributed to strengthening the 
political influence of particular families. However, international contracting authorities paid 
little attention to their involvement in national politics despite ties between some PSCs and 
clans being well known. 
 
President Karzai’s prohibition of armed PSCs in 2010 was an attempt to reign in agents that 
had “become rivals of the government” (Filkins/Shane 2010). According to the Afghanistan 
Analysts Network, Karzai had repeatedly expressed frustration over the fact that he could 
not control “who his international partners are employing, arming or empowering (e.g. 
PSCs)” (Checcia 2011: 3). In the aftermath of the decision, a total of 24 PSCs were declined 
Box 1: PSCs and their Clan Connections
Strategic Security Solutions International (SSSI): Linked to Hasseen Fahim, brother of the 
former First Vice President Marshal Fahim 
Watan Risk Management: Owned by the brothers Ahmad Rateb Popal and Rashed Popal, 
both cousins of former President Hamid Karzai and the late Ahmad Wali Karzai 
Elite: Belong to Sadeq Mojadedi, son of Hazrat Sibghatullah Mojadedi – a former chairman of 
the Meshrano Jirga – and Mowdud Popal 
NCL Holdings with ‘strategic partner’ NCL Security: Founded and chaired by Hamed 
Wardak, the son of former Defence Minister Rahim Wardak 
Asia Security Group (ASG): Founded by Hashmat Karzai, another cousin of the former 
President, who claims to have sold the company 
Logistics Solutions Group (LSG): Said to be linked to the son of an ANA division commander 
Shepherd Security: Reportedly headed by a cousin of Zaher Aghbar, former head of the 
Olympic Committee; Aghbar was responsible for PSC registration in the Ministry of Interior 
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government authorization to continue their businesses. Seven PSCs – NCL, SSSI, Watan 
Risk Management, LSG, Elite, Asia Security and Shepherd – were told to disband due to ties 
with high-ranking government officials (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2011).  
While the remaining PSCs are less conspicuously involved in Afghan power politics, the 
problem has by no means been resolved. Moreover, militias and auxiliary forces have been 
accused of similar links to power brokers at the provincial and state levels. The ALP has, in 
particular, proved to be a convenient medium for shoring up local and national patronage 
networks. In some cases, loyalty and kickbacks have been exchanged for permission to field 
an ALP unit.11 
3.2 Links with Illegal Armed Groups   
Links between force multipliers and illegal armed groups, including the Taliban, have posed 
an additional problem. These links have played a role in funding and empowering illegal 
actors who challenge the Afghan state and abuse the population. By the time the US had 
secured their preliminary victory against the Taliban in early 2002, most Afghan fighters 
were under the control of various warlords. In the following years, these strongmen 
continued to wield influence over armed groups, with powerbases on the district, 
provincial, and/or state levels. As late as 2010, the Afghan Ministry of Interior estimated 
that there were “no fewer than 2,500 unauthorized armed groups” in government-
controlled territories (UN 2010: 9).  
Illegal armed groups have taken advantage of the creation of force multipliers to 
continue operating in new and legal guises. Some groups have registered as PSCs, becoming 
private companies at the mere stroke of a pen (UN 2010: 9; House of Representatives 2010: 
20). Commanders of other informal armed groups have used auxiliary force programs, such 
as the ANAP, to regularize their men (Wilder 2007: 13-17; Lefèvre 2010: 6-7). In many 
cases, they control such forces in the same way they controlled their private armies. More-
over, commanders who managed to transform their militias into auxiliary police forces used 
the units to “harass previous foes and avenge old disputes” (Joint Briefing Paper 2011: 14). 
Even PSCs or auxiliary police that are not de facto incorporated militias or other armed 
elements have recruited experienced and armed personnel from both groups (UN 2010: 9).  
When illegal armed groups reinvented themselves as PSCs or auxiliary police forces, 
they tended to pursue their own agendas in local disputes. In the case of the ALP, they were 
now even able to act in the name of the state.12 As a group of NGOs noted:  
Some communities report that it is local warlords (not ‘communities’) who request the ALP; 
and that while selection is in some cases done through the shuras [councils, often composed 
of elders], in many cases the shuras are made up of former mujahedeen commanders who use 
the program as a means by which to provide their own militias with salaries and a cloak of 
 
 
11  Author’s telephone interview with human rights researcher, 4 July 2013. 
12  Author’s interviews with ISAF and NGO personnel, Camp Marmal, Mazar-e Sharif, 25 July 2013. 
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legitimacy. In other cases the shura process is circumvented altogether, with selection done by 
local commanders operating independently of the shura (Joint Briefing Paper 2011: 8). 
Furthermore, the Taliban has likewise been able to infiltrate the ranks of force multipliers. 
One example of Taliban fighters gaining employment with PSCs includes a suicide attack 
on an anti-narcotics base in Kabul (Tolonews 2014). Even the auxiliary police forces 
appointed former Taliban; in Badghis province, a Taliban commander along with 20 armed 
men – who had stoned a woman to death and were implicated in a series of beheadings – 
switched over to the government side and were incorporated into the ALP (AIHRC 2012: 
26-27).  
Subcontracting has been another way of cementing links between force multipliers and 
illegal armed groups. Most of the PSCs employed for convoy security under the US Host 
Nation Trucking contract, which delivered 70 percent of the US military’s supplies in 
Afghanistan, subcontracted “warlords, strongmen, commanders, and militia leaders who 
compete with the Afghan government for power and authority” (House of Representatives 
2010: 2). These subcontractors have often demanded protection payments from convoys 
passing through their territories, and they are believed to have, in turn, paid the Taliban for 
safe passage along vital highway routes (House of Representatives 2010: 34-35). Although 
several contractors reported extortion, bribes, special security and protection payments, the 
US Department of Defense did not make any effort to curb such practices (House of 
Representatives 2010: 4, 55-66). 
International PSCs have also relied heavily on subcontractors such as national PSCs, 
militias and warlords. According to an inquiry by the US Senate Committee on Armed 
Services, ArmorGroup contracted two local warlords – Nadir Khan (known as ‘Mr Pink’) 
and Timor Shah (known as ‘Mr White’) – to provide security at Shindand Airbase. The two 
warlords turned out to be in conflict with each other, and Shah assassinated Khan in 
December 2007. Moreover, Shah and Khan’s successors were later identified to be Taliban 
supporters (MacAskill 2010). Another company, EOD Technology, partnered with local 
commander Said Abdul Wahb Quattili to protect Army operations and sites in Adraskan 
despite the fact that his son was suspected of “being an agent to a hostile foreign 
government” (Senate 2010: v-iv; Aikins 2012: 7).  
3.3 Ineffective Regulation of PSCs 
The ineffective regulation of PSCs has contributed to the pathologies mentioned here. 
Although the Afghan government decreed that all national and international businesses had 
to be registered as early as March 2005 (UN 2010: 16), the need to first establish legal and 
administrative capabilities meant that “PSC regulation was virtually non-existent until the 
beginning of 2008” (Aikins 2012: 10). The Afghan Ministry of Interior therefore decided to 
adopt the Procedure for Regulating Activity of Private Security Companies (Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan 2008). The licensing process progressed only gradually; by 2009, a 
mere 25 international PSCs had registered with the Afghan Ministry of Interior (UN 2010: 
2). At its peak, the database listed a total of 52 licensed PSCs out of 90 companies estimated 
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to have been operating in Afghanistan (CNN 2010; Bundestag 2010: 4-5; De Nevers 2009: 
485).  
Enforcement of the procedure has remained another persistent problem. A special 
committee appointed by President Karzai in 2010 accused 16 PSCs of major offenses, 
including “the illegal use of weapons, illegal hiring, vehicle offenses and tax evasion” 
(Rivera/Sahak 2011). Ragin Spanta, the Afghan National Security Advisor, further observed 
that many companies had not registered their employees or weapons. The committee report 
concluded that nearly two thirds of national and international PSCs in Afghanistan had 
disregarded national laws and licensing regulations. 
3.4 Failure of the APPF 
The APPF was set up to resolve the issue of an uncontrolled private security industry in 
Afghanistan. However, the APPF’s development dragged on for a long time. The initial plan 
called for the incorporation of Afghan security guards who had been working for PSCs 
within the APPF. The guards would “then be sent back to the same places they worked 
before, and the companies that had formerly paid a private security company for the guards 
would instead pay the Interior Ministry to cover their salaries, plus a 20 percent fee for 
overhead and to provide a profit” (Rosenberg/Bowley 2012). However, few PSC employees 
were willing to transfer to the APPF, while clients remained doubtful of the standards of the 
new guard force. “Mohammad Hashim Mayar, an adviser to the Agency Coordinating Body 
for Afghan Relief, an umbrella group for nongovernmental aid organizations, said he feared 
that the new force would be poorly trained and end up as little more than a militia for the 
variety of power brokers who dominate Afghan politics – or the Taliban” (Rosenberg/ 
Bowley 2012). 
Left with little choice by the Afghan government, NATO and the US sought to assist in 
establishing the force by creating the APPF Advisory Group. The purpose of this group was 
“to advise and help train the guard force” (Rivera 2011). In 2011, the US reallocated US$ 35-
40 million to the APPF from funds designated by Congress for security in Afghanistan after 
a NATO assessment noted that the force had not met more than two thirds of 166 
“essential” criteria, including shortfalls in training, supplies, staff and funding (Rivera 2011). 
Owing to delays in the formation of the APPF, the Afghan government issued a 
‘bridging strategy’ that postponed the disbanding of the PSC industry until March 2012 
(SIGAR 2013: 1). In the meantime, clients were permitted to use PSCs as Risk Management 
Companies in addition to armed security provided by the APPF (SIGAR 2013: 1). 
Embassies were allowed to continue employing PSCs for armed protection indefinitely, 
while ISAF was given an extension to use PSCs until March 2013 (Aikins 2012: 12). In order 
to enable these exceptions, a number of national and international PSCs received renewable 
license extensions (Rønnevik 2012: 49). Some reconstruction and development projects 
kept using unlicensed PSCs for security services as APPF guards were considered both 
unprepared and lacking in standards (SIGAR 2013: 4-5). Guards were often transferred 
directly from PSCs to the APPF without further training. Moreover, existing loyalties to 
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“tribal leaders and provincial council members” persisted within the APPF, as did the 
possibility of Taliban infiltration (RIAN News Service 2012; Johnson 2014). 
In 2013, the APPF was still short of its 25,000 target strength with a mere 14,873 guards 
(SIGAR 2013: 2). Despite the creation of the APPF, many national and international PSCs 
have remained operational due to a lack of AFFP officers able to meet the demand for 
security services. Finally, in March 2014, the Afghan government announced its decision to 
disband the APPF. 
3.5 Problems with Recruitment and Vetting 
Problems with recruitment and vetting also resulted in infiltration of auxiliary police forces 
by illegal armed groups (Human Rights Watch 2011). In the case of the ANAP, local 
councils (shuras) were supposed to take the lead in recruiting members. In practice, 
however, a combination of elders, local power brokers and jihadi commanders were able to 
bypass the shuras. Many recruits were not from local districts but from outside. Although 
the ANAP focused on south and southeast Afghanistan, armed groups were randomly 
declared themselves to be part of the ANAP, even in districts for which ANAP was not 
planned (Lefèvre 2010: 6, footnote 16).  
The US military eventually shut down ANAP amidst negative reports. Most of the 
weapons, uniforms and equipment provided to the ANAP were allegedly never returned 
(Lefèvre 2010: 9). Unfortunately, the US military did not take this as a learning experience. 
Instead, it set up the AP3. As with ANAP, the AP3 guards were to be recruited by local 
shuras; yet in practice, the process was dominated by jihadi commanders. Moreover, vetting 
by the Ministry of Interior, the National Directorate of Security and US Special Forces 
lacked thoroughness (Lefèvre 2010: 9).  
In fact, the US supported the appointment of Ghulam Muhammad Hotak, a former 
jihadi and Taliban commander, as the head of the AP3. Once installed, Ghulam 
Muhammad Hotak integrated around 500 of his armed men into the force. Instead of 
reporting to the ANP, Ghulam Muhammad said he would report only to the US, due to 
personal rivalries between him and the provincial chief of police. By setting up the AP3, the 
US changed the local balance of power in a province resembling a “hornet’s nest of rivalries” 
(Lefèvre 2010: 11).   
Other auxiliary police programs have been similarly marred by problems with 
recruitment and vetting (Lefèvre 2010: 14-20). In this context, the ALP exhibits the starkest 
divide between planning and reality. According to the Procedure on the Regulation and 
Establishment of the Local Police of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, the ALP was placed 
under the authority of the Afghan Ministry of Interior and, on the provincial and district 
levels, the authority of provincial and district ANP commanders (AIHRC 2012). 
Additionally, community leaders, particularly shuras, were meant to assume a primary role 
in selecting ALP personnel as well as intervene in cases of misbehavior.  
However, the ALP Procedure was poorly drafted (Human Rights Watch 2011: 56-57; 
AIHRC 2012: 18), resulting in practices that have often diverged from its original intent. In 
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many districts, elders do not have any say in the ALP; instead, they were often faced with 
interference by US Special Forces in the recruitment process. In some cases, this led to the 
appointment of individuals with a reputation for preying on civilians (AIHRC 2012: 23-24). 
US Special Forces also rejected some ALP candidates recommended by Afghan district 
officials (Human Rights Watch 2011: 76). Lastly, brutal local commanders of armed groups 
were involved in the recruitment process for ALP members and units.  
3.6 Weak Command and Control 
Another pathology that has affected all three force multipliers to varying degrees is weak 
command and control by international forces and the Afghan government. In the case of 
PSCs, the US and ISAF have repeatedly been unaware of the actions of their contractors and 
unable to control them (Senate 2010). Local militias were a wild card within the strategies of 
the international forces from the very beginning they were under the control of Afghan 
strongmen and had no basis in law. 
Additionally, national and international supervision of the various auxiliary police forces 
has been weak. Based in Kabul, the Ministry of Interior has not always been capable of 
controlling dynamics within districts where local strongmen exert influence. The ANP, 
responsible for overseeing the ALP, has had difficulties as well, with local ALP commanders 
often proving too powerful for the ANP to control.13 In Herat province, the ALP had twice 
as many men as the ANP in 2011 (Human Rights Watch 2011: 70). UNAMA (2012: 34) 
reported that “ALP units routinely operate with limited oversight, management and 
command from centralized security structures”.  
To make matters worse, the ANP and ALP have been at loggerheads in some areas due 
to local conflicts with a strong ethnic dimension that have been lingering for decades. In 
Baghlan, US Special Forces set up allegedly the ALP without consulting or involving the 
ANP or other Afghan authorities (Goodhand/Hakimi 2014: 30; UNAMA 2011: 40; 
UNAMA 2012b: 46, footnote 118). This move exacerbated inter-ethnic violence as local 
Tajiks regarded the ALP to be a scheme that empowered Pashtun groups (UNAMA 2011: 
41).14 
The presence of US soldiers generally reduced the likelihood of abuses being carried out 
by their ALP agents; in several cases, the US demobilized auxiliary police who had violated 
human rights (Stevens 2013: 67; UNAMA 2012b: 49). From 2013, ISAF established an ALP 
watch list that documented violence committed by the ALP and recommended disbanding 
specific ALP units (UNAMA 2014b: 55). However, ALP abuses targeting the local 
 
 
13  Author’s interview with UNAMA representatives, Mazar-e Sharif, July 2013. 
14  It should be noted that Pashtun ALP often preyed on local Pashtuns as well (Goodhand/Hakimi 2014: 31).  
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population have been taken less seriously. The US military has tended to ignore reports 
about ALP brutality, choosing rather to praise their performance.15  
3.7 Freedom from Prosecution 
Patronage networks and lack of oversight have resulted in all three force multipliers 
enjoying effective freedom from prosecution. In 2010, British Major General Nick Carter 
warned that PSCs were operating in a “culture of impunity” in Afghanistan (Norton-Taylor 
2010). In particular, US contractors have been protected from local prosecution by a Status 
of Forces Agreement. Although this agreement envisages that crimes are to be tried in the 
US, very few American security guards have been charged in their home country. In one 
exceptional case, two former guards with the security company Blackwater, Justin Cannon 
and Chris Drotleff, were indicted after they opened fire on a car following a traffic accident 
in Kabul. In the process, the guards killed two people and wounded one (US District Court 
2010). Some have argued that the guards got off lightly with only one conviction for 
involuntary manslaughter, being acquitted of all other charges (Vergakis 2011). 
National PSCs and militias have also been known to operate with impunity. 
Connections with government officials along with military power have rendered private 
armed forces in Afghanistan “virtually exempt from criminal prosecution” (Rønnevik 2012: 
54). Sardar Mohammad – the long-time head of Ahmed Wali Karzai’s personal security 
guard force, who would later assassinate him in his own home – “was treated like family by 
Mr Karzai” (Sarwary 2011). Afghan officials described him as a criminal who kept a private 
prison and used dogs to torture people. However, he remained immune to prosecution 
owing to his links with Karzai. “He was accused of several murders but I could not arrest 
him,” a police official complained (Sarwary 2011). 
Furthermore, ethnic differences have played a role in hindering prosecution. In Kunduz 
province, where the majority ethnic group is Pashtun, most ALP commanders have been 
Tajik, Uzbek or Turkmen. Given these power structures, when the ALP violated the human 
rights of Pashtuns, state authorities such as the ANP and National Directorate of Security 
were unlikely to intervene. At times, the ANP abrogated responsibility of controlling the 
ALP by referring locals complaining of ALP misconduct to US forces.  
Even the US has been reluctant to prosecute the ALP, whose development it had 
supported strongly. In 2011, numerous reports about ALP misconduct against civilians 
emerged from Baghlan province. However, the ANP Criminal Investigation Division was 
thwarted in its attempt to investigate ALP suspects who had received backing from US 
Special Forces (UNAMA 2012: 36; Human Rights Watch 2011: 61; for another case see 
Ceccinel 2013). UNAMA representatives interviewed in 2013 in northern Afghanistan 
stated that they were unaware of a single case in which ALP members had been prosecuted, 
 
 
15  See Bakhtar News: Afghan Local Police Prove Essential To The Stability of Kunduz, 8 August 2013.  
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despite numerous allegations of misconduct.16 In many cases, international actors like the 
US and NATO turned a blind eye to human rights abuses, arguing that their own informal 
investigations provided little tangible evidence (Cavendish 2011). 
In sum, this section has identified two interrelated sets of explanations for when and 
why PSCs, the APPF, militia groups and auxiliary police forces have been a source of 
human insecurity in Afghanistan. The first explanation relates to the parochial interests of 
these armed groups that are often distinct from or even contrary to those of the Afghan 
government. The US is partially responsible for this situation as it has chosen to ignore the 
fact that its force multipliers pursue independent interests as long as they contribute to 
counter-insurgency. The second explanation lies in a lack of effective national and 
international oversight of PSCs, the APPF, militia groups and auxiliary police forces. Since 
these force multipliers have been viewed as temporary solutions, little effort has been made 
to develop appropriate institutions for their selection, vetting, management and control. 
The measures which have been adopted have come late, been incomplete and lacked force-
ful implementation. The following section illustrates the ways in which force multipliers 
have been able to impact negatively on the human security of the local population. 
4. Consequences for Human Security  
The main imperative of human security is the assertion that “security policy and security 
analysis, if they are to be effective and legitimate, must focus on the individual as the 
referent and primary beneficiary” (Newman 2010: 78). In particular, the human security 
perspective highlights two demands: freedom from fear and freedom from want. While 
these demands are widely accepted within academic and policy making circles, they have so 
far found little application in debates surrounding the international security assistance 
strategy in Afghanistan. This section argues that human insecurity has become a major 
problem in Afghanistan. Following Newman’s (2010: 80) mid-range definition of human 
insecurity as threats caused by human or social actors within conflict, failed states or 
repressive government, our analysis focuses on two forms of insecurity. The first is physical 
insecurity, such as hostilities, harassment, abuse, sexual violence illegal detention, torture 
and death. The second form refers to conflict-related economic insecurity such as extortion, 
theft and exploitation.  
4.1 Hostilities Affecting Civilians 
One consequence of insufficient regulations, training, oversight and equipment for force 
multipliers – such as the auxiliary police forces and PSCs – has been increased violence 
against civilians. The ALP has endangered civilians by hiding from Taliban attacks among 
villagers on account of being only lightly armed and a preferred target of the insurgents. 
 
 
16  Author’s interview, Mazar-e Sharif, July 2013. 
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Indeed, the Taliban has attacked the ALP up to ten times more often than other Afghan 
National Security Force components (SIGAR 2013b: 88; Goodhand/Hakimi 2014: 39). This 
has made villages with an ALP presence a target of hostilities. In Wardak province, it was 
noted that first the AP3 and later the ALP “acted as a magnet for insurgent attacks” 
(Goodhand/Hakimi 2014: 25).  
PSCs that have protected military convoys along the main highways in Afghanistan have 
likewise drawn local civilians into hostilities as they have sought protection or under the 
belief that the villagers were in fact insurgents. Especially along the highways, villagers have 
come under attack by PSCs fighting with insurgents. At one point, the Afghan Ministry of 
Interior decided to ban Watan Risk Management and Compass Security from escorting 
NATO convoys along the route between Kabul and Kandahar “after a pair of bloody 
confrontations with Afghan civilians” (Filkins 2010). Within two weeks, however, the ban 
was lifted again owing to the fact that NATO was unable to protect its supply routes without 
the two companies.  
4.2 Harassment, Sexual Violence, Illegal Detention and Torture  
Civilian complaints about PSCs, militias and auxiliary forces have been widespread, 
highlighting various forms of abuse such as harassment, sexual violence, illegal detention 
and torture (UN 2010b: 23; Rønnevik 2012: 55). A common practice among PSCs has been 
the unauthorized stopping of vehicles and the erection of roadblocks in order to harass 
civilians and collect ‘fees’ (UN 2010b: 22; Schmeidl 2008: 27). The frequency of public 
harassment by PSCs became “a political issue for Karzai” and was one reason for the 
government’s attempt to ban armed security contractors (Lawrence 2012). 
Another type of abuse has been sexual violence against women, children and men. The 
UN has received “information about armed groups and tribal militia (arbakis), some of 
whom have been employed in the local police force, sexually assaulting women and girls” 
(UN 2013: 4). Another form of abuse regards the practice of Afghan ‘dancing boys’ who are 
often “enticed or abducted when they are still children and held as property by an ‘owner’” 
(IRIN 2013). The international PSC DynCorp became embroiled in a major controversy 
when it hired dancing boys, allegedly as a farewell gesture for Afghan police recruits 
(Cavendish 2011; Boone 2010). Accusations of the abduction and rape of boys have also 
been levied at militia commander Azizullah, a supplier of protective services to the US 
forces, as well as members of the ALP (Rønnevik 2012: 55; Cecchinel 2013). Men have been 
targets of sexual violence during interrogations and in detention centers (UN 2013: 5). 
Human rights abuses can take many forms. An internal UN report recorded numerous 
instances between 2009 and 2010 in which militia commander Azizullah was involved in 
atrocities against the local population of Bermal district, including the mutilation of corpses, 
arbitrary detention, illegal house raids and shootings (Cavendish 2011; Rønnevik 2012: 55). 
Some ALP units have forced local people, including children, to defuse improvised 
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explosive devices (Cecchinel 2013). As one NGO worker in Northern Afghanistan said, 
“Everybody is afraid of the ALP.”17  
4.3  Killings 
Force multipliers have also posed a direct threat to human life in the form of injury and 
death due to the uncontrolled use of armed force as well as targeted killings. PSCs hired by 
the US military reportedly killed and wounded over 30 civilians during firefights in 
Maywand District between 2006 and 2009 (Schwartz 2010: 19). Additionally, there have 
been cases – such as that of the Blackwater employees Justin Cannon and Chris Drotleff 
noted above – in which civilians were killed by trigger-happy security guards (McGreal 
2010).  
While most casualties caused by security guards have been accidental, there have also 
been accusations of targeted killings by PSCs. UNAMA was told about one case in which 
“local private security contractors [were] alleged to have shot seven adult males and injured 
one child in what appears to have been extrajudicial killings” (UN 2010b: 24). Similarly, a 
member of the Norwegian forces reported “I often heard the claim that private security 
companies were involved in all sorts of criminal activities, ranging from extortion and 
protection rackets to kidnappings and assassinations” (Rønnevik 2012: 54).  
Militias have been equally involved in violence and the killing of civilians. Commander 
Ruhullah, who provided protection for ISAF supply routes, was “known to have dealt 
brutally with those – civilians or insurgents – who have impeded the flow of his trucks” 
(Filkins 2010). According to an anonymous Ministry of Interior official, Ruhullah “laid 
waste to entire villages” (Filkins 2010). Another militia unit in Andar district that 
collaborated with the international military forces executed three innocent civilians who 
had been arrested during a ground search operation (UNAMA 2014: 47).  
Official figures exist only for civilian casualties caused by the ALP. During the first six 
months of 2013, UNAMA documented 14 civilian deaths and 32 injuries in 32 separate 
incidents attributed to ALP (UNAMA 2013: 7). During the course of the year, responsibility 
was placed on the ALP for a 256 percent increase in civilian casualties compared to 2012 
(UNAMA 2014b: 50). For the first six months of 2014, UNAMA (2014: 40) documented 22 
civilian deaths and 29 injuries caused by the ALP.  
4.4  Extortion and Theft 
PSCs, militias and auxiliary police forces have not only threatened people’s physical 
integrity, but also their economic well-being by means of theft, robbery, extortion and the 
imposition of illegal taxes on local populations. 
 
 
17  Author’s interview with NGO worker, Kunduz city, 29 July 2013. 
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Reports speak of PSCs engaging in extortion, protection rackets, kidnapping, theft and 
looting (Rønnevik 2012: 54; see also Schmeidl 2008: 29; House of Representatives 2010: 3). 
Local businesses and the civilian population have been regular targets of economically 
motivated crime by PSCs (Schmeidl 2008: 25). The collection of fees at roadblocks and from 
local businesses is not simply evidence of corruption, it has taken on mafia-like proportions 
(House of Representatives 2010: 20; Schmeidl 2008: 30). Furthermore, local PSCs have been 
involved in the illegal economy, including drug trafficking, arms trade and prostitution 
(Rønnevik 2012: 54; Sherman/DiDomenico 2009: 1). The APPF has been similarly accused 
of participation in fraud, theft and involvement in the drug trade (Rønnevik 2012: 73).  
According to UNAMA reports, militias and the ALP have also stolen and extorted 
money from civilians. In Dasht-e-Archi district in Kunduz province, as an example, militias 
have looted homes and stolen motorcycles (UNAMA 2014b: 9). In that province as well as 
in Faryab province, the ALP has confiscated and demanded food, firewood and labor from 
locals (UNAMA 2014b: 52; UNAMA 2013: 7).  
A common practice among militias and auxiliary police forces has been the taxing of 
local populations (Lefèvre 2010: 18). In Kunduz province, some commanders expanded 
their power base by fielding both ALP units funded by the Ministry of Interior and by 
establishing militias living from Islamic taxes (ushr) that they levied from villagers. It has 
often been unclear whether armed men represented the ALP or simply another militia, not 
least because some militias acquired ALP uniforms and pretended to be ALP.18 People who 
refused to pay militias or the auxiliary police forces risked being labeled as insurgent 
supporters, making themselves viable targets. As one community elder told UNAMA: 
There are 46 mosques in Khoja-Kenti area; each week one mosque must supply the ALP and 
Arbakies with one livestock and 100 pieces of bread. Families have to contribute equally to 
supply these items to the armed groups; any family that fails to contribute will be in trouble 
with the ALP commander, most probably the head of family will be accused of supporting the 
Taliban. (UNAMA 2013: 55). 
Inversely, during times when the Taliban exploited the local population, the ALP would 
sometimes attack people paying these taxes, even if they had no choice.19 
4.5  Economic Exploitation 
While members of force multipliers are frequently accused of extortion and crime, one 
must recognize that they are also victims of poverty. The international coalition forces have 
exploited local poverty and underdevelopment to obtain cheap security forces. The fact that 
local Afghan security guards and APPF personnel “are typically paid just a few hundred 
dollars a month … is testament to the poverty that racks this country” (Ahmed 2012). 
 
 
18  Author’s interviews with several NGO staff from Kunduz, Kunduz city, 29 July 2013, and with UNAMA 
representatives, Mazar-e Sharif, July 2013. See also UNAMA 2012b: 48-49. 
19  Author’s interview with UNAMA representatives, Mazar-e Sharif, July 2013. 
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Moreover, in the case of the APPF, security guards have often failed to be paid their regular 
salary by the Ministry of Interior.  
Furthermore, force multipliers have helped to keep casualties among the international 
coalition and national Afghan forces at a minimum. As the New York Times notes, private 
security guards serve “as the first line of defense against bombings and bullets meant for 
Westerners and high-profile Afghan government officials. In countless cases, such private 
security guards are the ones killed by thwarted attacks” (Ahmed 2012). The rate of US-
employed private security guards killed in Afghanistan has been 2.75 times higher than that 
of US troops (Schwartz 2011: 9). Contractors engaged in convoy security are even eight 
times more likely to be killed in action than uniformed personnel (Schwartz 2011: 9). 
Among the APPF and ALP, casualty figures have been high as well; according to NATO 
data, a total of 1,028 ALP members, or 4.1 percent of the force, were killed in action between 
2013 and 2014 (SIGAR 2014: 101). 
Afghan government mismanagement and corruption has exacerbated economic 
insecurity among the APPF and the ALP. In some instances, international clients had to pay 
the APPF directly, in addition to the fees that they paid the Afghan government for security 
services, since the guards never received their salaries and threatened to leave. ALP 
members would sometimes go without pay due to funds disappearing in Kabul or on the 
provincial and district levels. In 2014, an ALP unit “cut the power lines from Kabul to 
eastern Laghman and Nangahar Provinces in retaliation for not being paid for three 
months” (SIGAR 2014: Introductory statement). Some unpaid ALP units preyed on 
citizens. In one case from Archi district, the Afghan government failed to pay the ALP for 
several months after US troops had ceased direct cash payments. In response, the ALP 
demanded food from villagers in addition to levying Islamic taxes. Several villagers who had 
refused to pay were killed.20  
This section has demonstrated that force multipliers have often taken advantage of the 
support as well as the lack of oversight by the US and other actors in order to pursue their 
own interests at the expense of the local population. The disturbing repercussions this has 
had on human security in Afghanistan have been largely ignored or considered a price that 
has to be paid in order to subdue the insurgents. This report contends that this is a 
misconception and that future policies must be directed towards curtailing the role of force 
multipliers in Afghanistan and in other interventions.  
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
In Afghanistan, force multipliers have been utilized for many reasons such as to compensate 
for the absence of national security forces, to maintain a small military footprint, to reduce 
the cost of the intervention, to circumvent parliamentary control, and to enhance local 
 
 
20  Author’s interview with several NGO staff from Kunduz, Kunduz city, 29 July 2013. 
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ownership. This report has illustrated that all these reasons have encouraged international 
actors, particularly the US, to support and make use of PSCs, the APPF, militias and 
auxiliary police forces as part of their security strategy. 
In congruence with largely external reasons for employing local force multipliers, any 
negative consequences related to their use and activities have primarily been analyzed in 
terms of state security and their implications for international strategic objectives. The 
detrimental impact of force multipliers for the security of the local population has either 
been disregarded or accepted with the argument that the ends – especially the suppression 
of the insurgency – justify the means.  
The present study challenges this perspective. Increasing the human security of the 
Afghan population and rebuilding a viable long-term security system have been the 
ultimate objectives of strategic goals such as the fight against the Taliban. PSCs, the APPF, 
militias and auxiliary police forces have undermined the achievement of these overarching 
objectives due to problems associated with particular interests, local connections, 
regulation, recruitment, vetting, command, control and prosecution. 
In the pursuit of their parochial interests, in order to strengthen their own power or that 
of related actors, and because they are not effectively controlled, international force 
multipliers have become a cause of human insecurity. Accusations levied against PSCs, the 
APPF, militias, and auxiliary police forces have included the harassment, rape, torture, 
illegal detention, killing and exploitation of civilians. 
The fact that force multipliers have often gone unpunished for their crimes has bred 
additional resentments among the population. Criminal investigations have not only been 
hindered on account of local civilians often being unsure of whether the perpetrators are 
legal or illegal forces, but also because international and local actors have protected 
members of PSCs, the APPF, militias and auxiliary forces from prosecution.  
In conclusion, this report recommends the following: 
1. In Afghanistan and other military interventions, international actors should resist the 
temptation to use armed force multipliers as a quick-fix solution for filling gaps in local 
and international force structures. Using force multipliers redirects important resources 
away from the construction of viable public security institutions (RUSI 2009: 102; 
Jackson 2010: 7). Moreover, it undermines DDR and leads to a proliferation of armed 
groups that compete with and weaken state security forces. It is optimistic at best and 
naïve at worst to believe that armed groups, once created, will simply go away. This 
report has demonstrated that PSCs, militias and auxiliary forces have become 
entrenched in the system, with an ability to reinvent themselves in the face of attempts to 
abolish them. Indeed, some of the auxiliary police forces created under international 
auspices, such as the Critical Infrastructure Program, continued to operate after the 
Afghan government ordered their disbandment (UNAMA 2012b: 45). 
2. International actors should instead focus on helping to create effective and accountable 
national military and police forces. In Afghanistan, this means strengthening the 
international support for the ANA and ANP. This is an opportunity for the new NATO-
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led Resolute Support Mission, which replaced ISAF in January 2015. The ANA and ANP 
remain mired in problems (SIGAR 2015b). Improvements in their standards and 
behavior should, however, be possible by redirecting resources and training from force 
multipliers to the ANA and ANP. International literacy programs have already 
improved literacy rates within the ANP in comparison to the ALP (AIHRC 2012: 28). 
More importantly, many local citizens hold the ANP in higher regard than the ALP and 
argue that the state should use the ANP instead of the ALP to create security (AIHRC 
2012: 37). In 2012, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission wrote: “In 
almost all interviews done with experts, local government officials in provinces and 
districts, and local population [sic], the ANP was preferred to the ALP and concerns 
were raised about the future of the ALP” (AIHRC 2012: 46). Preferences for the ANP 
stem not least from the fact that the ANP is subject to better command and control. In 
contrast, this report has shown that the ALP has been a bottom-up initiative with weak 
centralized control and subject to the vagaries of local power politics.  
3. In the light of the analyses stated above, international actors should facilitate DDR and 
the integration of local force multipliers in Afghanistan. With the abolition of the APPF, 
this does not mean reverting to the use of PSCs for the protection of the remaining 
international military and civilian operations, but rather supporting the integration of 
private security personnel into public armed and police forces. International actors 
should also refrain from supporting militias and opt to facilitate the merger of the ALP 
with the ANP. Promoting effective and accountable security sector governance should 
be a priority of NATO’s Resolute Support Mission and of the international presence in 
Afghanistan more broadly.  
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